Abstract. Ristenpart et al. showed that the limitation of the indifferentiability theorem of Maurer et al. which does not cover all multi-stage security notions Sm but covers only single-stage security notions Ss, defined reset indifferentiability, and proved the reset indifferentiability theorem, which is an analogy of the indifferentiability theorem covers all security notions S (= Ss ∪ Sm):
Introduction

Indifferentiability
The Indifferentiability theorem [17] of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein (MRH), called MRH theorem, ensures that for all single-stage security notions S s the security of a cryptosystem in the F 2 model is ensured in the F 1 model by proving that "F 1 is indifferentiable from F 2 ", denoted by F 1 F 2 . In the framework with which the MRH theorem is proven, two interfaces of a system F among adversaries and honest parities are considered, an "adversarial interface" accessed by adversaries, denoted by F.adv, and an "honest interface" accessed by honest parties, denoted by F.hon. The indifferentiable game of F 1 F 2 is a simulation based game where constructing some stateful simulator S which represents some adversary in the F 2 model which can obtain any information on F 1 .adv in the F 1 model by using information on F 2 .adv. The definition of F 1 F 2 is that there exists a stateful simulator S such that for any distinguisher D which interacts with two oracles (L, R), no D can distinguish a real world (L, R) = (F 1 .hon, F 2 .adv) from an ideal world (L, R) = (F 2 .hon, S F 2 .adv ) where S has access to F 2 .adv. MRH proved the following theorem:
which means C is at least as S-secure in F 1 model as in F 2 model, where C is a set of all cryptosystems.
Impossibility of IFRO security in Multi-Stage Security Games
However, Ristenpart, Shacham, and Shrimpton (RSS) [21] pointed out that though indifferentiability covers all single-stage security notions S s , it does not cover all multi-stage security notions S m . In a multi-stage game, the size of the state shared among adversaries is restricted.
The reason why indifferentiability does not cover S m is that the indifferentiable game deal with a "stateful" simulator, that is the size of the sate of the simulator is not restricted, while in the multi-stage game the size of the state shared among adversaries is restricted.
They defined a two party challenge response protocol CR and its security, called CRP-security as a counter example against indifferentiability. They showed that CR is CRP-secure in the RO model but insecure when using an IFRO hash function such as the ChopMD hash function and the Sponge hash function.
Note that the RSS result does not always imply that for any S ∈ S m , any C ∈ C which is S-secure in the RO model is insecure when RO is replaced by H U . So we have the following question:
"Can we prove the S-security of C with H U ?" This paper tackles how to solve this question. The candidate to solve this question is reset indifferentiability of RSS [21] .
Reset Indifferentiability
The reset indifferentiability framework is an extension of the indifferentiability framework and this theorem, called RSS theorem, covers all security notions S (= S s ∪ S m ). The RSS theorem ensures that for any S ∈ S and for any C, the S-security is preserved when F 2 is replaced with F 1 if F 1 is reset indifferentiable from F 2 , denoted by F 1 r F 2 . The reset indifferentiable game is the same simulation based game as the indifferentiable game [17] , where indifferentiability deals with a stateful simulator, while reset indifferentiability deals with a stateless simulator. The "stateless" setting reflects the setting of multi-stage security games where the state size among adversaries is restricted. So the definition of F 1 r F 2 is that there exists a stateless simulator S such that for any distinguisher D which interacts with two oracles (L, R), no D can distinguish a real world (L, R) = (F 1 .hon, F 2 .adv) from an ideal world (L, R) = (F 2 .hon, S F 2 .adv ). RSS proved the following theorem.
RSS Theorem. [21] F 1 r F 2 ⇒ ∀C ∈ C, ∀S ∈ S: C(F 1 ) S C(F 2 ).
Therefore, if H U r RO, for any S ∈ S and any C ∈ C the S-security of C is preserved when RO is replaced with H U .
Unfortunately, RSS also proved the impossibility of H U r RO where H is a one-pass hash construction such as the ChopMD construction and the Sponge construction. That is, it is impossible to simulate information of U (= H U .adv) from that of RO (= RO.adv). Therefore, we have to consider another solution than the RO methodology.
Our Contributions -A New Proposal of WRO Methodology -
We propose a WRO methodology which is based on "Reset Indifferentiability from Weakened Random Oracle (WRO)" in order to ensure the S-security of C with H U . This paper deals with the ChopMD construction and the fixed output length Sponge (FOLSponge) constructions as H U , because these are employed in important hash functions such as SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, which are in FIPS 180-4, and SHA-3 winner Keccak.
The concrete proof procedure of the WRO methodology is as follows:
1. Define a new concept of WRO instead of RO, 2. Prove that H U r WRO assuming U is ideal, and 3. Prove that C is S-secure in the WRO model.
As a result we can prove that C with H U is S-secure by combining the results of Steps 2, 3, and the RSS theorem. Moreover, for public-key encryption (as cryptosystem C) and Chosen Distribution Attack [1, 2] (as game S) we will prove that C(WRO) is S-secure, which implies the appropriateness of the new concept of the WRO model.
We define WRO so that one can construct a stateless simulator such that H U r WRO, that is, an adversary can simulate information of U (= H U .adv) from WRO.adv. We define WRO which consists of RO and sub oracle O * which leaks information to simulate U. The interfaces are defined as WRO.hon = RO and WRO.adv = (RO, O * ). If we can construct such WRO, for any S ∈ S and any C ∈ C, the S-security is preserved when WRO is replaced with H U by the RSS theorem.
To our knowledge, our result is the first result to ensure the reducibility from a real model to an ideal model for the important hash constructions, ChopMD and FOLSponge.
How to Define O˜. We define O * based on the IFRO proof of the ChopMD, ChopMD h RO, where h : {0, 1} m+2n → {0, 1} 2n is a random oracle compression function. The output of the two block message
) where chop n accepts 2n bit value x x * and returns the right n bit value x * . In this case, the real world is (L, R) = (ChopMD h , h). In the indifferentiable game, since distinguisher D interacts with (L, R), helpful information for D is just query-response values from L and R. Therefore, the following two points are required to construct a simulator S. The first point is the simulation of h. The second point is the simulation of the relation between L and R in the real world, because L uses R in the real world. The following explains the simulations as considering the use of the S's state.
Simulation of h:
We explain the simulation of h by using Fig. 1 . This example is that D makes a repeated query. In the real world the responses y 1 and y 2 satisfy the following conditions, since R is a random oracle h, -Condition 1: y 1 is a random value and y 2 = y 1 .
The following demonstrates that S satisfying the condition can be constructed by using the S's state. Then S records the query response pair (x, y 1 ). In
Step 2 S finds y 1 from the query response pair (x, y 1 ) for the repeated query x, y 2 := y 1 , and responds y 2 . Simulation of the L-R Relation: We explain the simulation of the relation between L and R by using Fig. 2 . In the real world, since (L, R) = (ChopMD h , h), the query response values in Fig. 2 
The important point of this simulation is to find M 1 from both the query y 1 M 2 and the recoded pair (M 1 , y 1 ).
We can construct a stateful simulator S which ensures the two points. On the other hand, no one can construct a stateless simulator S which ensures the two points. So we compensate the stateless setting by using sub oracle O * .
Related Works
There have been some independent studies [13, 16] 
They also show a necessary condition of parameter s (i.e., s = l − m − log q > 0) to prove H U rr,s RO for any domain extender H, where l is the maximal input length of H, m is the input length of the ideal primitive of H (e.g., compression function) and q is the number of query of S. Their theorem is only valid for the case s > 0; that is, their result is still restricted to specific multi-stage games. Indeed, unfortunately, their approach cannot cover security games that shared state between adversaries in multi-stage is restricted to zero (i.e., s = 0). Because the CDA game is the case s = 0, they cannot salvage H for the CDA game while our result can do that.
Luykx et al. [16] propose a relaxed model that is called i-reset indifferentiability. This model restricts distinguisher D so that D is allowed to reset the memory of simulator S only i times while the reset indifferentiability allows D to reset any times. That means, the number of stages in multistage games is equal or lower than i. They define that 
Unfortunately, they show the impossibility that H U r,i RO cannot be proved for any one-pass hash construction even if i = 1. Hence, their approach cannot salvage practical H. On the other hand, our result can salvage important and practical one-pass H such as ChopMD and FOLSponge (Theorems 2 and 3); therefore, our methodology with WRO is more suitable in a practical sense.
Preliminaries
Notations. For two values x, y, x||y is the concatenated value of x and y. For some value y, x ← y means assigning y to x. When X is a non-empty finite set, we write x $ ← − X to mean that a value is sampled uniformly at random from X and assign to x. ⊕ is bitwise exclusive or. |x| is the bit length of x. For sets A and C, C Throughout this paper, we assume that any algorithm and game is implicitly given a security parameter as input if we do not explicitly state.
Indifferentiability Frameworks [17, 21] . The indifferentiability framework [17] ensures reducibility from one system F 1 to another system F 2 in any single-stage game, where an adversary uses a single state. That is, this framework ensures that the security for any single-stage game is preserved when F 2 is replaced by F 1 . This framework ensures the reducibility in any single-stage by proving that information in the F 1 model can be obtained in the F 2 model. This framework deals with two types for information in the F i model for i = 1, 2; Information from an adversarial interface, denoted by F i .adv to which adversaries have access, and information from an honest interface, denoted by F i .hon to which honest parties have access. In this framework, the reducibility reflects in a simulation based game, called an indifferentiable game: When considering the reducibility from F 1 to F 2 , the advantage of this game is defined as follows.
where S is a simulator which has access to F 2 .adv and D is a distinguisher which has access to left oracle L and right oracle R.
The reducibility from F 1 to F 2 is ensured by showing that there exists a stateful simulator S such that for any D the indifferentiable advantage is negligible in the security parameter [17] . The reset indifferentiability framework [21] is an extension of the indifferentiability framework and covers any multi-stage game in addition to any single-stage game. A multi-stage game is that the size of the state shared among adversaries are restricted. The restricted situation is covered by dealing with a stateless simulator. When considering the reducibility from F 1 to F 2 , the advantage of this game is defined as follows.
The reducibility from F 1 to F 2 is ensured by showing that there exists a stateless simulator S such that for any D the indifferentiable advantage is negligible in the security parameter [21] . If there exists such S then F 1 is reset indifferentiable from F 2 . More precisely, RSS gave the following theorem. 
Theorem 1 (RSS Theorem [21]). Let
Pr[A wins in F 1 model in G] ≤ Pr[B wins in F 2 model in G] + Adv r-indiff F 1 ,F 2 ,S (D). Moreover, t B i ≤ t A i + q A i t S , q B i ≤ q A i q S , t A ≤ m + t G + ∑ m i=1 q G,i t A i , q A ≤ q G,0 + ∑ m i=1 q G,i t A i where t A , t B ,
Definitions of Hash Functions.
We give the description of the ChopMD construction [12] . Let h be a compression function which maps a value of d+n+s bits to a value of n+s bits. The ChopMD ChopMD h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is defined in Fig. 3 . pad c : {0, 1} * → ({0, 1} d ) * is an injective padding function such that its inverse is efficiently computable. IV is a constant value of n + s bits. We give the description of the FOLSponge construction [6] . Let P be a permutation of d bits. The FOLSonge FOLSponge
is an injective padding function such that the last n-bit value is not 0. IV is a constant value of d bits.
Reset Indifferentiability from WRO
RSS [21] proved the impossibility of proving that the ChopMD and the FOLSponge are reset indifferentiable from random oracles. To compensate the impossibility, we change the ideal world from a random oracle to a weakened random oracle (WRO). We define WRO such that both of the ChopMD and the FOLSponge are reset indifferentiable from WROs. For a hash function H U using an ideal primitive U, the advantage of reset indifferentiability from WRO is defined as follows.
WRO
We define WRO as (RO n , RO * v , RO † w , T O, IC a,b ), where RO n , RO * v , RO
Adv r-indiff
The RSS theorem ensures that if H U is reset indifferentiable from a WRO, for any game the security of any cryptosystem is preserved when a WRO is replaced by H U , where in the WRO model adversaries have access to WRO.adv and the cryptosystem has access to WRO.hon, and for the H U case, adversaries have access to U and the cryptosystem has access to H U .
Reset Indifferentiability for ChopMD
In this proof, we define the parameter of WRO as w = s and v = n + s. An intuition of the proof is shown in Subsection 1.5. The proof for the ChopMD hash function is given in Section 4.
Reset Indifferentiability for FOLSponge
We define the parameter of WRO as w = c and b = d. We don't care the key size a, since IC a,b can be regarded as random permutation by fixing a key k * . We denote E(k * , ·) by a random permutation
Theorem 3. Assume that the underlying permutation P is a random permutation and P −1 is its inverse oracle. There exists a stateless simulator S = (S F , S I ) such that for any distinguisher D,
where D can make at most q L , q F and q I queries to left L = FOLSponge P /RO n and right oracles
S makes at most 4q queries and runs in time O(q).
In the following, we outline why a stateless simulator can be constructed. To simplify the explanation, we omit the padding function of FOLSponge P . Therefore, queries to L are in ({0, 1} n ) * . Since D interacts with (L, R F , R I ), helpful information for D is obtained from these oracles. Thus, the S's tasks are to simulate the following two points.
-Simulation of P and P −1 : Since in the real world R F = P and R I = P −1 , S must simulate P and P −1 . -Simulation of L-R relation: There is a relation based on the FOLSponge construction among query-response values of L and of R F in the real world, since L = FOLSponge P and R F = P . We consider the following example.
• D makes query X 1 (:= IV ⊕ (M 1 0 c )) to R F and receives the response Y 1 .
• D makes query X 2 (:= Y 1 ⊕ (M 2 0 c )) to R F and receives the response Y 2 . In the real world, there are the relations 
Using WRO, we can construct a stateless simulator which succeeds in these simulations.
-Simulation of P and P −1 : S succeeds in this simulation by using P and P −1 ; S returns the response of P(x) for query x, and returns the response of P −1 (y) for query y. -Simulation of L-R relation: S succeeds in this simulation by using RO † c and T O. For example, we consider the above queries by D.
• For query
As a result, we can construct a stateless simulator S which succeeds in the simulations of (P, P −1 ) and of the L-R relation. Thus we can prove Theorem 3. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Proof of Theorem 2
First we define a graph G MD , which is initialized with a single node IV . Edges and nodes in this graph are defined by query-response values to R, which follow the MD structure. The nodes are chaining values and the edges are message blocks. (Fig. 6 may help to understand the path) . In this proof, the padding function pad c is removed. Thus queries to L are in ({0, 1} d ) * . Since the ChopMD with pad c is the special case of one without pad c , the security of the ChopMD without pad c ensures the security of one with pad c .
We define a stateless simulator S in Fig. 7 .
Step 8 ensures the simulation of h and Steps 2-7 ensure the simulation of the L-R relation.
Detail
In the following, for the simulator S in Fig. 7 and any distinguisher D, we evaluate the bound of the reset indiferentiable advantage of ChopMD h from WRO. To evaluate the bound we consider the following five games. In each game, D has access to (L, R).
-Game 1 is the ideal world, that is, (L, R) = (RO n , S). Let G i be an event that D outputs 1 in Game i. We thus have that
In the following, we justify the above bound by evaluating each difference. -For a query y to T O, w was responded, and then for the repeated query a different value w * is responded. From the definition of T O, there are two cases for (w, w * ).
• Diff 1 : w =⊥ and w * =⊥.
• Diff 2 : w =⊥ and w * =⊥.
We thus have that
We justify the bound as follows. First we bound the probability of Pr[Diff 1 ]. Since the response w of the first query is ⊥, when the first query is made, the query w * to RO † s such that y = RO † s (w * ) was not made. Since the response w * of the repeated query is not ⊥, when the repeated query is made, the query w * to RO † s was made such that y = RO † s (w * ). Therefore, first y is defined. Second, the output of RO † s (w * ) is defined. Thus, Pr[Diff 1 ] is bounded by the probability that the response of RO † s (w * ), which is an s-bit random value, hits the value y. Since the numbers of queries to RO † s and T O are at most q R times,
Next we bound the probability of Pr[Diff 2 ]. Since the response w of the first query is not ⊥, when the first query is made, the query w to RO † s was made such that y = RO † s (w). Since the response w * of the repeated query is ⊥, when the repeated query is made, a query w to RO † s was made such that w = w and RO † s (w) = RO † s (w ). Therefore, Pr[Diff 2 ] is bounded by the collision probability of RO † s . We thus have that 
where S 1 is called at most q R times in Game 2 and σ times in Game 3. 
Game 3 ⇒ Game 4. From Game 3 to Game 4, we change L where in Game 3 L(M ) = RO n (M ), while in Game 4 L(M ) = ChopMD S 1 (M ). Therefore, the modification does not change D's behavior iff in Game 4 ChopMD S 1 (M ) = RO n (M ). Since Lemma 1 ensures that for any MD path IV
M − → z, z = RO † s (M ) RO n (M )
Multi-Stage Security in the WRO Model
In this section, we show appropriateness of our WRO methodology. We construct a (non-adaptive) CDA secure [2] PKE scheme in the WRO model. Specifically, we show that if a PKE scheme satisfies an weak security (i.e., IND-SIM security [21] ) in the RO model, then it is also CDA secure in the WRO model. An IND-SIM secure PKE in the RO model is easily obtained by applying a known technique [21] that any CPA secure PKE scheme can be converted into IND-SIM secure by using EwH [1] and REwH1 [2] in the RO model. Therefore, our result implies that a very large class of PKE schemes is CDA secure in the WRO model (e.g., factoring-based, Diffie-Hellman-based, lattice-based, etc.).
Furthermore, our result in Section 3 guarantees to instantiate WRO by ChopMD or FOLSponge. Hence, finally, we have that any CPA secure PKE in the RO model can be converted into CDA secure with ChopMD or FOLSponge. While the previous work [21] showed CDA secure PKE schemes only with the specific NMAC hash function, our work achieves CDA secure PKE schemes with large class of hash functions (i.e., ChopMD and FOLSponge). CDA Security. We explain the CDA security (we quote the explanation of the CDA security in [21] ). Fig. 8 illustrates the non-adaptive CDA game for a PKE scheme AE using a functionality F . This notion captures the security of a PKE scheme when randomness r used in encryption may not be a string of uniform bits. A CDA adversary A 1 , A 2 is a pair of procedures, the first of which is a (µ, ν)-mmr-source. The CDA advantage for a CDA adversary A 1 , A 2 against scheme AE using a functionality F is defined by
AE,F ⇒ true] − 1. As noted in [2] , in the RO model, mmr-sources have access to the RO. In this setting, the minentropy requirement is independent of the coins used by the RO, meaning the bound must hold for any fixed choice of function as the RO. If this condition is removed, one can easily break the CDA security (i.e., A 1 and A 2 can easily share the messages (m 1 , m 2 , r) ) for any cryptosystem using any indifferentiable hash function.
IND-SIM Security. The IND-SIM security is a special notion for PKE schemes. It captures that an adversary cannot distinguish outputs from the encryption algorithm and from a simulator S even if the adversary can choose plaintext and randomness. As noted in [21] , in the standard model this security goal is not achievable because AE uses no randomness beyond that input. In the RO model, we will use it when the adversary does not make any RO queries. A variety of PKE schemes is shown to satisfy IND-SIM security in the RO model. 
CDA Security in the WRO
} .
B makes no RO queries, makes ν RoS-queries, and runs in time that of
. maxpk AE is the maximum public key collision probability defined as
The proof outline is as follows: First, we start with game G 0 which is exactly the same game as the CDA game in the WRO model. Secondly, we transform G 0 to game G 1 so that RO n returns a random value when A 1 poses a message that is posed to RO n by Enc to generate the challenge ciphertext. In game G 1 , outputs of RO n does not contain any information about computations to generate the challenge ciphertext for A 1 . Thirdly, we transform G 1 to game G 2 so that ciphertext c is generated from a simulator S in the IND-SIM game. In game G 2 , ciphertext c does not contain any information about outputs of A 1 . Thus, A 1 cannot hand over any information to A 2 with c. Fourthly, we transform G 2 to game G 3 so that the table of inputs and outputs of each oracle in WRO (except RO n ) for A 1 is independent of the table for A 2 according to the output of A 1 . In game G 3 , queries to sub-oracles for A 2 does not contain any information about the output of A 1 , and A 1 cannot hand over any information to A 2 with sub-oracles. Finally, we transform G 3 to game G 4 so that RO n returns a random value when A 2 poses a message that is posed to RO n by Enc to generate the challenge ciphertext. In game G 4 , outputs of RO n does not contain any information about computations to generate the challenge ciphertext for A 2 . Thus, the advantage of A 2 in G 4 is nothing.
The proof of Theorem 4 is shown in Appendix C.
Another Secure Cryptosystem in the WRO Model
In addition to the PKE setting, we consider the ID-based encryption (IBE) setting. Specifically, we show a generic construction of IBE, called IDREwH1 which is an analogy of REwH1, and is nonadaptive ID-based CDA (ID-CDA) secure in the WRO model if underlying IBE scheme is ID-CPA secure in the RO model. Therefore, any ID-CPA secure IBE in the RO model can be generically converted into ID-CDA secure IBE in the WRO model. The detail of the result on IBE is shown in Appendix D. 
B Proof of Theorem 3
We define a graph G S , which is initialized with the single node IV . Edges and nodes in this graph are defined by query response values to R F and R I which follow the Sponge structure. The nodes are chaining values and the edges are message blocks. For example, if (
We denote the path by IV Fig. 10 may help to understand the graph). We call a path following the Sponge structure "Sponge path". In this proof, we omit the padding function pad S . Thus queries to L are in ({0, 1} n ) * . Note that the FOLSponge with pad S is the special case of one without pad S . Thus the security of the FOLSponge without pad S ensures the security of one with pad S . We define a stateless simulator S in Fig. 11. Step 7 of S F ensures the simulation of P and Step 7 of S I ensures the simulation of P −1 . Steps 2-6 of S F and Steps 2-6 of S I ensure the simulation of the L-R relation.
Detail. In the following, for the simulator S in Fig. 11 and any distinguisher D, we evaluate the bound of the reset indiferentiable advantage of FOLSponge P from WRO. To evaluate the bound we consider the following six games. In each game, D has oracle access to the left oracle L and the right oracles (R F , R I ).
-Game 1 is the ideal world, that is, (L, R F , R I ) = (RO n , S F , S I ). -Game 2 is that (P, P −1 ) are changed into (P 1 , P −1 1 ) shown in Fig. 12 . So the simulator has oracle access to (P 1 , P −1 1 ) instead of (P, P −1 ). -Game 3 is (L, R F , R I ) = (RO n , S1 F , S1 I ), where S1 = (S1 F , S1 I ) keeps all query-responses (X, Y ) where Y = S1 F (X) or X = S1 I (Y ). For a query X to S1 F , if there is (X, Y ) in the query-response history, then S1 F returns Y , otherwise, S1 F returns the output of S F (X). For a query Y of S1 I , if there is (X, Y ) in the query-response history, then S1 I returns X, otherwise, S1 I returns the output of
corresponding with FOLSponge S1 F (M ), and then returns the response of
Let G i be an event that D outputs 1 in Game i. We thus have that
In the following, we justify the above bound by evaluating each difference.
Game 1 ⇒ Game 2.
From Game 1 to Game 2, we change the underlying oracle of (R F , R I ) from (P, P −1 ) to (P 1 , P 
Game 2 ⇒ Game 3. From Game 2 to Game 3, we change (R F , R I ) from (S F , S I ) to (S1 F , S1 I ) where (S1 F , S1 I ) record query-response values while (S F , S I ) don't record them. Therefore, if a query X to R F (resp. Y to R I ) was made where the response is Y (resp. X), for a repeated query X to R F (resp. Y to R I ) the same value Y (resp. X) is responded, while in Game 2 there is a case that for some repeated query R F (X) (resp. R I (Y )) where Y (resp. X) was responded, a distinct value Y * (resp. X * ) is responded. 
where (S F , S I ) are called at most q times in Game 3 and σ times in Game 4. 5 . In Game 5 R is called at most σ times and for any query to S the response is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} c . We have that
Game 5 ⇒ Game 6. From Game 5 to Game 6, we change (R F , R I ) from (S1 F , S1 I ) to (P, P −1 ), where outputs of (S1 F , S1 I ) are chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} d , while (P, P −1 ) are a random permutation and its inverse oracle. The difference is thus bounded by the collision probability of outputs of (S1 F , S1 I ) in Game 5. We thus have that
C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We denote Adv(A, G i ) by the advantage of the adversary A when participating in experiment G i . We start with game G 0 which is exactly the same game as the CDA game in the WRO model. It means Adv(A,
Game G 1 : RO n returns a random value if the following event occurs:
-Bad 1 : A 1 poses a message M to RO n where M is posed to RO n by Enc to generate the challenge ciphertext.
All other procedures are computed as the same way in G 0 . 
Lemma 3. |Adv(A,
In game G 2 and G 3 , ciphertext c does not give any information about (m 0 , m 1 , r) and queries to WRO by A 1 to A 2 . On queries to RO n , interfaces of A 2 in G 2 and G 3 are identical. Thus, the only way to pose such a query is guessing under min-entropy µ, or the output length w of RO T and the output length b of (E, D). According to the birthday paradox, for oracles RO * and RO † the probability of collisions in guessing is at most (2q RO * ) 2 /2 µ , and (2q RO † ) 2 /2 µ , respectively. Also, for oracle T O the probability of collision in guessing is at most (2q T O ) 2 /2 µ if µ < w, (2q T O ) 2 /2 w otherwise, and for oracles E and D the probability of collisions in guessing is at most (2q E ) 2 /2 µ and
Game G 4 : RO n returns a random value if the following event occurs:
A 2 poses a message M to RO n where M is posed to RO n by Enc to generate the challenge ciphertext.
All other procedures are computed as the same way in G 3 . , m 1 , r) . Also, outputs of WRO is independent of (m 0 , m 1 , r) for A 2 . Thus, the only way to win in game G 4 is randomly guessing β. Therefore, Adv(A, G 4 ) = 0.
Lemma 6. |Adv(A,
To conclude, we have Adv The proof outline is as follows: First, we start with game G 0 which is exactly the same game as the ID-CDA game in the WRO model. Secondly, we transform G 0 to game G 1 so that challenge ciphertext c is generated from fresh randomness instead of the output of RO n . Thirdly, we transform G 1 to game G 2 so that challenge ciphertext c is generated from all zero messages instead of given messages from A 1 . In game G 2 , ciphertext c does not contain any information about outputs of A 1 . Finally, we transform G 2 to game G 3 so that the table of inputs and outputs of each oracle in WRO (except RO n ) for A 1 is independent of the table for A 2 according to the output of A 1 . In game G 3 , queries to oracles for A 2 does not contain any information about the output of A 1 , and A 1 cannot hand over any information to A 2 with WRO. Thus, the advantage of A 2 in G 3 is nothing. Proof. The difference between G 0 and G 1 only occurs in two cases: One is the case when adversary A 1 (i.e., without knowledge of params) poses (params, id * , m β , r) to RO n where m β ∈ m β and r ∈ r. The other is the case when adversary A 2 (i.e., with knowledge of params) poses
Proof. We denote
